TCPIPINFO USING VMSECURE IN THE TCP/IP FOR VM


 
 APAR Identifier ...... II11256      Last Changed ........ 04/09/21
 TCPIPINFO USING VMSECURE IN THE TCP/IP FOR VM
 
 Symptom ...... IN INCORROUT         Status ........... CLOSED  CAN
 Severity ................... 4      Date Closed ......... 98/06/12
 Component .......... INFOPALIB      Duplicate of ........
 Reported Release ......... 001      Fixed Release ............
 Component Name PA LIB INFO ITE      Special Notice
 Current Target Date ..              Flags
 SCP ...................
 Platform ............
 
 Status Detail: ASSIGNMENT - APAR has been assigned to a
                             programmer.
 
 PE PTF List:
 
 PTF List:
 
 Parent APAR:
 Child APAR list:
 
 ERROR DESCRIPTION:
 ***************************************************************
 * Topic: VMSECURE and TCP/IP Servers                          *
 * Last Update: 21 Sept 2004 (GWS)                             *
 *                                                             *
 * This informational APAR contains information relevant to    *
 * running any TCP/IP levels,                                  *
 * in conjunction with the VMSECURE product from Sterling      *
 * Software, Inc., for controlling access to minidisks and/or  *
 * SFS directories.                                            *
 *                                                             *
 * This information may also prove useful when other external  *
 * security manager offerings -- such as ACF2 -- are used, as  *
 * similar changes will be necessary.  However, it's           *
 * recommended that you contact the support center associated  *
 * with the security package in use, for detailed information  *
 * about any changes that are required.                        *
 *                                                             *
 ***************************************************************
 
 Purpose of this Informational APAR:
 To provide information to customers who are installing TCP/IP
 running the VMSECURE security package from Sterling Software,
 Inc.
 
 ===============================================================
 Additional References
 =====================
 Sterling Software, Inc. Support Center:  1-703-264-8100
 
 Technical Information:
 
 The following guidelines should be completed prior to
 proceeding with individual TCP/IP server customization.
 Following the "General Requirements" section are instructions
 for specific TCP/IP server machines that utilize the function
 provided by VMSECURE.
 
 ===============================================================
 General Requirements:
 
 1) Contact Sterling Software's VMSECURE technical support, and
    request a copy of the VALIDAT ASSEMBLE file to be used
    with TCP/IP.  This routine performs DIAG A0
    subfunction '0004' to validate passwords.  The following
    steps should be followed to create a VALIDAT MODULE from
    the VMSECURE supplied VALIDAT ASSEMBLE code.  After
    the VALIDAT MODULE has been created, it must then be
    placed on a disk in the search order of the server virtual
    machines that need to use it.  It's recommended that the
    executable VALIDAT MODULE be installed on the "server
    common" disk (by default, this is the TCPMAINT 198).  This
    disk is guaranteed to be in the search order of all TCP/IP
    service virtual machines.
 
 To generate an executable VALIDAT MODULE from the Sterling
 Software-supplied source, perform the following steps:
 
     a) Assemble the source file.  The syntax to use is:
 
          assemble VALIDAT
 
     b) Generate the executable load module using the following
        command sequence:
 
          LOAD VALIDAT (CLEAR NOAUTO RLDSAVE
          GENMOD
 
        These commands will create a VALIDAT MODULE and a LOAD
        MAP file on the A-disk.  The LOAD MAP file can be
        discarded.  The VALIDAT MODULE should be installed as
        instructed above.
 
 c. Assemble the RPIUVMX source file and generate an executable
 RPIUCMS MODULE.
 
    The syntax to use is:
    GLOBAL MACLIB DMSGPI DMSOM OSMACRO OSMACRO1 ASMAHL RPIUVMX
    LOAD RPIUVMX (CLEAR RLDSAVE
    GENMOD RPIUCMS MODULE A2 (SYSTEM
 
    These commands will generate an RPIUCMS MODULE and a
    LOAD MAP on the A-disk.  The LOAD MAP can be discarded.
    The RPIUCMS MODULE should be installed as instructed
    above.
 
 *NOTE* if you do not need local modifications to the supplied
 VALIDAT and RPIUVMX ASSENBLE files, or if you are unable to
 assemble them on your system you can also use the Computer
 Associates supplied VALIDAT MODULE and RPIUCMS MODULE.
 
 2) The following statement SHOULD be included in the directory
    definition for each TCP/IP server that accesses VMSECURE
    for security validation:
 
      IUCV DUALPASS
 
    Its benefit is seen in the situation when the FTP server
    attempts to validate a userid / password pair, but the
    VMSECURE service machine is not available for some reason.
    Without the DUALPASS statement, the validation will fail
    with a specification check; when this statement included,
    validation will be performed via an alternate path.
 
    Note: Inclusion of the IUCV DUALPASS statement is not a
          "hard" or immediate requirement.  However, you should
          consider it's use.
 
 ==============================================================
 SYSTEM DTCPARMS File Customization:
 
  Server configuration exit execs (such as FTPDXIT EXEC) are no
  longer provided with TCP/IP FL 310 or higher. For information
  about server configuration with a higher level please see
  "Chapter 5 - Methods of Server Configuration" of the "TCP/IP
  Planning and Customization" publication.
 
  This chapter explains the use of the IBM (or SYSTEM) DTCPARMS
  file which is now used for server customization.  If you are
  using VMSECURE as your External Security Manager (ESM), the
  parameters and values indicated below should be made to your
  SYSTEM DTCPARMS file.
 
 ===============================================================
 FTP Server (FTPSERVE) Customization:
 
 1) FTP class definition changes:
 
    .* File Transfer Protocol (FTP) daemon
    :nick.ftp     :type.class
                  :name.FTP daemon
                  :command.SRVRFTP
                  :runtime.PASCAL
                  :diskwarn.YES
                  :anonymous.NO
                  :ESM_Enable.YES
                  :ESM_Validate.
                  :ESM_Racroute.
 
    .* For VMSECURE, change the ESM_validate. tag to:
    .*
                  :ESM_Validate.VALIDAT
 
    .* For VMSECURE, change the :ESM_racroute tag to:
 
                  :ESM_Racroute.YES
 
 2) In the VM:SEcure AUTHORIZ CONFIG file, include the following
    two lines:
 
       GRANT DIAGPCHK TO "ftp_server_userid"
       GRANT SURROGAT TO "ftp_server_userid"
 
    where "ftp_server_userid" is replaced by the user ID of the
    FTP server machine (the default user ID is: FTPSERVE).
 
 ===============================================================
 Rexec Daemon/Server (REXECD) Customization:
 
 1) REXEC class definition changes:
 
    .* Remote Execution (REXEC) daemon
    :nick.rexec   :type.class
                  :name.Remote Execution daemon
                  :command.REXECD
 
                  :runtime.C
                  :anonymous.NO
                  :ESM_Enable.YES
                  :ESM_Validate.
                  :ESM_Racroute.
 
    .* For VMSECURE, RPIVAL should be changed to VALIDAT, as
    .* follows:
                  :ESM_Validate.VALIDAT
 
 To allow RPIUCMS to be called for the REXEC logon by function
 available with z/VM 4.4.0 and above change the ESM_Racroute tag
 to:
                  :ESM_Racroute.YES
 
 2) In the VM:SEcure AUTHORIZ CONFIG file, include the following
    line:
 
       GRANT DIAGPCHK TO "rexec_server_userid"
 
     where "rexec_server_userid" is replaced by the user ID of
     the REXEC server machine (the default user ID is: REXECD).
 
 ===============================================================
 NFS Server (VMNFS) Customization:
 
 1) NFS class definition changes:
 
    .* Network File System (NFS) daemon
    :nick.nfs    :type.class
                 :name.Network File System daemon
                 :command.VMNFS
                 :runtime.C
                 :diskwarn.YES
                 :anonymous.NO
                 :ESM_Enable.YES
                 :ESM_Validate.
                 :ESM_Racroute.
 
   .* For eTrust VM:Secure, change the ESM_Validate tag to:
 
                    :ESM_Validate.VALIDAT
 
   .* For eTrust VM:Secure, change the :ESM_Racroute tag to:
 
                    :ESM_Racroute.YES
 
 2) In the VM:SEcure AUTHORIZ CONFIG file, include the following
    two lines:
 
       GRANT DIAGPCHK TO "nfs_server_userid"
       GRANT SURROGAT TO "nfs_server_userid"
 
    where "nfs_server_userid" is replaced by the user ID of the
 
    NFS server machine (the default user ID is: VMNFS).
 
 Note: If "anonymous" mount requests are to be accepted from
       NFS clients, ensure the following conditions have been
       met:
 
       * An ANONYMOU user ID is defined on the VM/ESA host
         system.
 
       * The VMNFS server entry in the DTCPARMS file has been
         updated to specify:
 
           :Anonymous.YES
 
 ===============================================================
 Additional Notes:
 
 For certain environments, the presence of a secondary user
 definition for a TCP/IP server machine may cause password
 prompts to be issued by the ESM when client requests.  This
 phenomenon has been seen with VMSECURE in cases where
 minidisks passwords are not defined; prompts issued by
 VMSECURE may be similar to the following:
 
   VMXACM0107R Enter MULT link password:
   VMXACM0107R Enter WRITE link password:
   VMXACM0107R Enter READ link password:
 
 The use of a secondary user definition in such an environment
 is not recommended.
 
 ===============================================================
 KEYWORDS:  5735FAL00 FL310 R310 TCP/IP TCPIP VM TCPIPINFO
            ESM VMSECURE VALIDATE FTPSERVE VMNFS REXECD
 ===============================================================
 
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 TEMPORARY FIX:
 
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